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THE POLITICS OF URBAN NATURAL AREAS MANAGEMENT
AT THE LOCAL LEVEL: A CASE STUDY
STEVEN M. DAVIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The topic of public conservation lands and their management most
likely elicits a response, from scholars and ordinary citizens alike, related to
National Parks, National Forests, or National Wildlife Refuges. As
biologists James Miller and Richard Hobbs assert, "[f]rom the perspective
of someone who lives in a city or suburb, conservation is too often
something that happens somewhere else-in a national park, [or]
wilderness area."' Yet it is the most local jurisdictions of public
conservation lands, and not remote federal lands in the West, that most
people live near and see and use on a regular basis. To demonstrate, the
fifty most visited city parks in the United States have roughly the same total
annual visitors as all 391 units comprising the National Park System, which
reports total annual visitation of 274 million.2 The importance of what
Miller and Hobbs collectively refer to as "[c]onservation [w]here [p]eople
[1]ive and [w]ork 3 is suggested by the fact that Busse Woods, a two
thousand acre unit of the Forest Preserve District of Cook County located in
the suburbs of Chicago, Illinois, receives 2.5 million annual visits-more
than Yellowstone National Park.
The centrality of local conservation lands in peoples' everyday
lives is certainly not mirrored in public lands literature, which is
disproportionately focused on federal lands. This sizeable body of literature
examines federal resource management agencies' history and policy
outputs, 5 analyzes agencies' power and internal political dynamics, 6 and
*Professor of Political Science, Social Science Department, Edgewood College, 1000
Edgewood College Drive, Madison, WI, 53711. Email: davis@edgewood.edu.
1 James R. Miller & Richard J. Hobbs, Conservation Where People Live and Work, 16
CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 330, 334 (2002).
2 Compare THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, THE MOST VISITED CITY PARKS (2009), available
at http://www.tpl.org/content-documents/citypark-facts/ccpe-Most-Visited-Parks-09.pdf, with Public
Use Statistics Office, National Park Service, NPS Stats, http://www.nature.nps.gov/stats/view
Report.cfm?selectedReport=-SystemSummaryReport.cfm (select "2008" within dropbox and click "Go")
(last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
3 Miller & Hobbs, supra note 1, at 330.
4 FRIENDS OF THE FOREST PRESERVES & FRIENDS OF THE PARKS, THE FOREST PRESERVE
DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY: STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PHASE I 14 (2002), available at
http://www.fotfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/FPDCC-Study-Phase-l.pdf [hereinafter FOTFP
REPORT ].
5 See generally WILLIAM C. EVERHART, THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (1972) (considering
the mission of the Forest Service and how it has broadened into a social institution concerned with
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examines their interactions with outside interests and public participation.
At the most local and intimate level, however, the political dynamics
surrounding public land managers, and the issues such managers face,
remain less examined and less understood.8
This Article argues that public land management in local urban
jurisdictions, (both city and county) and the political behaviors and
dynamics embedded therein, are not necessarily a miniature version of the
federal land management model. Rather, intrinsic differences exist between
the structure and nature of federal and local agencies. Local managers also
have a particular sort of interplay with local interests, constituents, and the
broader public. Finally, and most importantly, unique issues arise from the
very nature of a conservation mandate in the urban context. All of these
considerations make the politics of public land management at the local
humans and the environment); RONALD A. FORESTA, AMERICA'S NATIONAL PARKS AND THEIR
KEEPERS (1984) (analyzing National Park System traditions and the need for aggressive policies);
MICHAEL FROME, THE FOREST SERVICE (2d ed. 1974) (discussing the history of the Forest Service's
achievement in natural resource protection); SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (University of Pittsburgh
Press 1999) (1959) (discussing conservation through the history and political structure of the
Progressive Era); A VISION FOR THE U.S. FOREST SERVICE: GOALS FOR ITS NEXT CENTURY (Roger A.
Sedjo ed. 2000) (examining the political atmosphere the Forest Service must work within to achieve its
purpose); RICHARD WEST SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY (1997)
(outlining the historic policy conundrum of the National Park Service between tourism management and
increased ecological concerns).
6 See generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, THE FOREST RANGER: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR (1960) (studying the U.S. Forest Service and advocating an integrated conservation policy
for modem times); JEANNE NIENABER CLARKE & DANIEL MCCOOL, STAKING OUT THE TERRAIN:
POWER AND PERFORMANCE AMONG NATURAL RESOURCE AGENCIES (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the
current window of political opportunity for conservation efforts); Terence J. Tripple & Douglas J.
Wellman, Herbert Kaufman's Forest Ranger Thirty Years Later: From Simplicity and Homogeneity to
Complexity and Diversity, 51 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 421 (1991) (discussing current developments and
policy changes in the Forest Service and the impact of public administration on Kaufman's ideas
described in The Forest Ranger).7
See generally PAUL J. CULHANE, PUBLIC LAND POLITICS: INTEREST GROUP INFLUENCE ON
THE FOREST SERVICE AND THE BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT (1981) (pointing out the conflict
between interest group pressure and professional responsibility faced by land managers of the Forest
Service. A study of interest group influence provides a caveat to agency theory.); JOHN C. FREEMUTH,
ISLANDS UNDER SIEGE: NATIONAL PARKS AND THE POLITICS OF EXTERNAL THREATS (1991)
(analyzing the encroachment of civilization upon parks protected and regulated by the National Park
Service); Steven Davis, Does Public Participation Really Matter in Public Lands Management?: Some
Evidence from a National Forest, 25 SOUTHEASTERN POL. REV. 253 (1997) (studying public
participation and its influence on policy outcomes in the Forest Service, placing an emphasis of Siskiyou
National Forest); Paul Mohai, Public Participation and Natural Resource Decision-Making: The Case
of the RARE H Decisions, 27 NAT. RESOURCES J. 123 (1987) (critiquing the Forest Service's practice of
avoiding conflict between interests groups and arguing for more public participation); Paul A. Sabatier
et al., Hierarchical Controls, Professional Norms, Local Constituencies, and Budget Maximization: An
Analysis of US. Forest Service Planning Decisions, 39 AM. J. POL. SCI. 204 (1995) (describing the U.S.
Forest Service's decision-making process as a function of bureaucratic conservatism, hierarchical
controls, and budget maximization).
A similar project has attempted to examine the political dynamics and issues surrounding
public lands on the state level. See Steven M. Davis, Preservation, Resource Extraction, and Recreation
on Public Lands: A View from the States, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303 (2008).
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level quite distinct from the familiar, and well-documented, patterns of
federal land management.
This Article attempts to shed more light on the unique politics
surrounding the management of urban conservation lands through a case
study of a particularly interesting policy conflict during the mid 1990s in
one of the nation's largest urban conservation systems, the Forest Preserve
District of Cook County, Illinois. Although the intensity and broad scope
of this battle over the District's Natural Areas Restoration Program far
exceeds what is usually found at the local level, the case offers valuable
insight into some of the patterns shaping public land management in the
urban context.
II. PUBLIC LAND MANAGEMENT AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
This Article examines municipal and county government agencies
managing conservation lands in metropolitan regions. It also excludes
federal or state management of urban parks, such as the Golden Gate
National Recreation Area in San Francisco or the William Powers State
Park in Chicago. Also excluded are County Forest systems in rural areas.
These County Forests, mostly in the Upper Midwest, contain large, often
remote blocks of forest that are managed very similarly to State and Federal
forests.9
In contrast to the wealth of data regarding federal land, no readily
available set of comprehensive data exists regarding the acreage of natural
areas in United States city and county park systems. This phenomenon is
likely due to jurisdictional fragmentation and the intermingling of
conservation lands and recreational areas, including picnic areas, ball-
fields, lawns, and formal parks, within most urban park systems.
For cities, the best data comes from The Trust for Public Land
(hereinafter "TPL"), which has compiled data on park systems in 85 large
cities. This data compilation showed that of 690,955 city agency acres
within city limits, 288,126 acres (40.2%) were held as natural areas.' If
small and mid-sized cities' park systems were added to these figures, the
overall acreage of city parks would undoubtedly be a great deal larger.
Some notable conservation holdings within city park systems include those
9 For example, Wisconsin has a 2.5 million acre County Forest system. Wis. County Forests
Ass'n, Wisconsin County Forests Acres, http://www.wisconsincountyforests.comlwcfa-acr.htm (last
visited Feb. 21, 2010). These acres were pieced together through tax forfeitures early in the 2 0
century, in 29 counties across the North Woods. Wis. Dept. of Natural Res., County Forests,
http://dnr.wi.gov/forestry/county/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
10 THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, NATURAL, DESIGNED AND UNDEVELOPED ACRES AS A
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL AGENCY ACRES: FY 2007 (2008), available at http://www.tpl.org/content
_documents/cityparkfacts/ccpeTotalAcresbyPercentage_08.pdf (data excludes federal, state, or
county forest acreage located within city limits)
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of Albuquerque, Houston, Dallas, Austin, Anchorage, Bakersfield, Phoenix,
Jacksonville, Los Angeles, New York City, Portland, San Diego,
Louisville, and San Antonio." Most of these systems consist of thousands
of acres each.'
2
Although there is considerably less data on conservation acreage
held by county governments, one can safely speculate that it exceeds that of
city park systems. For example, just the seven urban counties in
northeastern Illinois have over 178,000 acres in their county forest preserve
districts, 3 and the nation's largest county park system in Maricopa County,
AZ (Phoenix) has 120,000 acres alone.1 4  While most urban county park
systems are considerably smaller, some sizeable systems include those
found in Harris, Texas (26,296 acres), 15 Santa Clara, California (45,000
acres), 16 Montgomery, Maryland (over 34,000 acres), 17 King, Washington
(25,000 acres), 18 Hillsborough, Florida (over 70,000 acres), 19 San Diego,
California (over 44,000 acres), 20 Riverside, California (71,656 acres), 2' and
Jackson, Missouri (21,000 acres).22 Additionally, there are a number of
I1 See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, ACRES OF PARKLAND BY CITY AND AGENCY: FY 2007
(2008), available at http://www.tpl.org/content-documents/citypark~facts/ccpeTotatAcresCityand
Agency2008.pdf.
12 1d
13 See Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, Land Acquisition Plan,
http://www.fpdcc.com/tier3.php?content id=6 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); KENDALL COUNTY FOREST
PRESERVE DIST., MASTER PLAN: MAY 2008 4 (2008), available at
http://www.co.kendall.il.us/forest_preserve/pdf/MasterPlanRevision.pdf; FOREST PRESERVE DIST. OF
KANE COUNTY, FOREST PRESERVE DISTRICT OF KANE COUNTY PROPERTIES 2009 (2009), available at
http://www.kaneforest.com/fp/fpMap.pdf; Forest Preserve Dist. of Will County, About Us,
http://www.reconnectwithnature.org/will-county-forest-preserve-district/about-the-district (last visited
Feb. 21, 2010); McHenry County Conservation Dist., Home Page,
https:l/www.mccdistrict.orglweblindex.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); Forest Preserve Dist. of DuPage
County, Conservation, http://www.dupageforest.com/conservation/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010); Lake
County Forest Preserves, Your Forest Preserves,
http://www.lcfpd.org/preserves/index.cfn?fuseaction=preserves.view (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
14 Parks & Recreation, Maricopa County,http://www.maricopa.gov/parks/history.aspx (last
visited Feb. 21, 2010).
15 COMM'R'S COURT, HARRIS COUNTY, CAPITAL IMPROVEMENTS 6 (2009), available at
http://www.co.harris.tx.us/agenda/2009/06-23-09FY%202009-10%2OCIP-Agenda.pdf.
16 Dept.of Parks and Recreation, Santa Clara County Gov't,
http://www.sccgov.org/portal/site/parks/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
17 Dept. of Parks, Montgomery County, About the Department of Parks,
http://www.montgomeryparks.org/about/index.shtm (last visited Feb. 21,2010).
Is King County, Natural Areas and Working Resource Lands,
http://www.kingcounty.gov/recreation/parks/naturalareas.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
19, Parks, Recreation and Conservation Dept., Hillsborough County,
http://www.hillsboroughcounty.org/parks/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
20 County of San Diego, Parks and Recreation, About Us,
http://www.sdcounty.ca.gov/parks/aboutus.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
21 RIVERSIDE COUNTY REGIONAL PARK AND OPEN-SPACE DIST., 2008-2009 ANNUAL
REPORT 11(2009), available at http://www.riversidecountyparks.org/rivcoparks/wp-
content/uploads/2009/09/Annual-Report-2008-2009.pdf.
22 Jackson County, Parks & Recreation,
http://www.jacksongov.org/content/3279/5215/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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special hybrid park districts that represent broader regions, such as the
Nashville/Davidson Metropolitan Board of Parks, or much smaller areas,
such as the Fairmont Park Commission in Philadelphia.23
City and county land management entities often exist as
straightforward executive agencies in city or county government.24
However, some enjoy a far more independent status as special park districts
with their own governing boards, which often have taxing power.25 Due to
a history of favorable state legislation, Illinois leads the nation in its number
of such special park districts.26
With 3,033 general purpose county governments, 19,492 municipal
27governments, and 1,355 special park districts2 in the United States, it is
difficult or nearly impossible to characterize the typical local land
management agency.29 With an incredible profusion of distinct governing
entities, there is simply too much variation in region, structure, financing,
and the size and character of the urban, suburban, or exurban setting.
Perhaps one characteristic that most city and county land management
agencies share is that they generally run very lean operations. While larger
county and city park agencies have hundreds, and occasionally thousands,
of employees, many other agencies have considerably smaller full-time
staffs. 0 Furthermore, actual conservation staff members in either of these
settings are likely to represent a minority among a park system's personnel,
especially in more recreation-oriented park systems.3'
23 See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 11, at 5-6.
24 See id.
25 Richard C. Trudeau, Special Park Districts, PARKS AND RECREATION, Jan. 1996, at 63.
26 id.
27 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND PUBLIC SCHOOL SYSTEMS BY TYPE
AND STATE: 2007 (2008), http://www.census.gov/govs/cog/GovOrgTab03ss.html.
28 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 GOVERNMENTS INTEGRATED DIRECTORY (2008),
http://harvester.census.gov/gid/gid 07/options.html (select "All States" and "Special District Govts")
(providing the list of all special park districts).
29 Note that this study focuses only on local governments in urban or suburban areas. One of
the more generous definitions of what qualifies as an urban or suburban area is what the Census Bureau
calls "Metropolitan Statistical Areas" or "MSAs", which consist of a minimum of 50,000 people.
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB BULL. No. 08-01, UPDATE
OF STATISTICAL AREA DEFINITIONS AND GUIDANCE ON THEIR USES app. at 2 (2007), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/bulletins/fy2008/b08-0l.pdf. This encompasses 1,092 counties (about
a third of all counties) in 363 United States MSAs. Id. app. at 3.
3 0 
See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LAND, REGULAR, NON-SEASONAL EMPLOYEES PER 10,000
RESIDENTS, BY MAJOR CITY AGENCY: FY 2008 (2009), available at
http://www.tpl.org/content-documents/cityparkfacts/ccpeEmployeesbyAgency09.pdf (providing data
for the full-time staff of larger park systems); see infra note 51 (providing the mean staff number of
government employees in the U.S. who work in parks, recreation, and natural resources agencies in
local government setting).
31 See FRIENDS OF THE FOREST PRESERVES & FRIENDS OF THE PARKS, THE FOREST
PRESERVE DISTRICT OF COOK COUNTY: STUDY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: PHASE 1128, 30, 33, 35, 85
(2002), available at http://www.fotfp.org/wp-content/uploads/2009/09/FPDCC-Study-Phase-II.pdf
[hereinafter FOTFP REPORT I] (providing that the Cook County Forest Preserve has a total staff of
approximately 800 with only 56 full-time individuals employed in conservation-related roles).
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
Although local governments spend more on parks, recreation, and
natural resources than the states and federal government combined, the
incredible fragmentation of over 23,000 local governments translates to an
average operating and capital budget of less than $2 million per agency.32
Given the existence of several huge park systems in large metropolitan
areas, one could expect the median budget to be substantially lower. Table
1 (below) summarizes the difference in park resources by level of
government.
32 U.S. CENsus BuREAu, TABLE 1. STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES BY LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT AND BY STATE: 2005-06 (2008), http/www.census.gov/govs/estimate
0600ussl l.html.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
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TABLE 1-MEAN BUDGETS AND EMPLOYEES PER PARK AGENCY BY LEVEL OF
GOVT.
Avg. # of Operating
Land & Capital Mean Permanent Mean
Number of Mmt. Budgets- Expenditure FTE FTE staff
Goenument o gi. Nat. Res. & per Agency Employees- pe
Governments Agencies Parks (in millions Nat. Resource Agency
Per (in billions $) & Parks
Juridicion $)
U.S./ 133 43 12.4"5 3,100.036 68,056"7 17,01438
Federal
State 5039 2.2540 26.841 241.442 179,88243 1,62144
Local4  23,77946 07 47.248 2.049 275,81350 1251
33 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2002 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS, REPORT No. GC02-1(P) 1 (2002),
available at http://tp2.census.gov/govs/cog/2002COGprelimreport.pdf.
34 CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT AGENCIES: BACKGROUND ON
LAND AND RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 2 (2004), available at
http://www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32393.pdf (four federal agencies, the Forest Service,
the Bureau of Land Management, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National Park Service, manage
93.5% of the 628.4 million acres of federal land).
35 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 308 (2008),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2007pubs/08abstract/fedgov.pdf.36 id.
37 U.S. Forest Serv., General Careers Overview,
http://www.fs.fed.us/fsjobs/jobs overview.shtml, (last visited Feb. 12, 2010); Nat'l Park Serv., U.S.
Dept. of the Interior, Quick Facts, http://www.nps.gov/aboutus/quickfacts.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2010); Div. of Human Capital, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., What is the Fish and Wildlife Service?,
http://www.fws.gov/jobs/whyfws.html (last visited Feb. 12,2010); Bureau of Land Mgmt., U.S. Dept.
of the Interior, Why BLM, http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/res/blmjobs/WhyBLM-mission.html (last
visited Feb. 12, 2010).
38 This figure is derived from dividing the Permanent FTE Employees by the average number
of Land Management Agencies per jurisdiction.
39 REPORT NO. GC02-1 (P), supra note 33, at 1.
40 Steven M. Davis, Preservation, Resource Extraction, and Recreation on Public Lands: A
View from the States, 48 NAT. RESOURCES J. 303, 315 tbl.4 (2008) (figure extrapolated from data that
includes department-level agencies that manage school trust lands).
41 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 32.
42 Id.
43 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT DATA: MARCH 2007 (2009),
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/07stus.txt.
44 This figure is derived from dividing the Permanent FTE Employees by the average number
of Land Management Agencies.
45 For purposes of this table, "local" means counties, municipalities, and special park
districts.
46 REPORT No. GC02-1(P), supra note 33, at 1, 7. This number includes county, municipal,
and special park district governments.
47 See infra note 51 (providing an average number assumption on the part of the author).48 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 32.
49 d.
50 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2007 PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT DATA: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2009),
http://ftp2.census.gov/govs/apes/07locus.txt.
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III. THE NATURE OF URBAN CONSERVATION LANDS
Perhaps the most profound distinction between federal and local
land management relates to the physical differences of the land units
managed. Federal preserves tend to be huge, remote blocks of land ranging
from tens of thousands, to millions of acres each. For example, the vast
majority of national forests in the 192 million acre, 155 unit system, are
between 250,000-1,000,000 acres, with a mean unit acreage of 1.24 million
acres.52 Urban parcels, on the other hand, are quite a bit smaller. Most city
park systems have an average unit acreage not exceeding double digits.
53
More importantly, unlike the vast federal lands, urban preserves tend to be
heavily used, degraded, and thoroughly fragmented islands of nature
surrounded by urban, suburban, or exurban development. 54  These
considerations push the focus of the local land manager in a direction far
removed from the issues dominating a federal manager's attention, such as
timber sales, energy production, grazing leases, wilderness, road-building,
or wildlife management.
The urban context surrounding the typical city or county natural
area presents a unique, and especially difficult, set of challenges. As Miller
and Hobbs catalogue:
[H]uman settlement presents numerous barriers to
movement [of wildlife]. . . . Moreover, residential
development presents political obstacles to the restoration
of historical variability in ecological processes, such as
fires or floods, on which elements of biodiversity may
depend. Human settlement may also act as a source of
exotic or domesticated species that compete with or prey
upon native plants and animals .... Urban and suburban
environments are synonymous with extreme habitat
fragmentation and exemplify the biotic homogenization
occurring across the globe.55
51 It is important to note that the mean encompasses disparate city and county park systems
whose employment numbers range from one to thousands. See supra note 26 (This number is derived
by using the 275,813 figure of local government employees in the U.S. who work in parks, recreation,
and natural resources and assuming that each local government in the U.S. has an average of one park
agency which produces a mean staff of 12).
52 U.S. FOREST SERV., DEPT. OF AGRIC., TABLE 1 - NATIONAL AND REGIONAL AREAS
SUMMARY (2008), http://www.fs.fed.us/iand/stafflar/2008ITABLEI.htm.
5
3 See THE TRUST FOR PUBLIC LANDS, PARK UNITS PER 10,000 RESIDENTS: FY 2008 (2009),
available at http://www.tpl.org/contentdocuments/citypark~facts/ccpeParkUnits09.pdf; THE TRUST
FOR PUBLIC LANDS, supra note 10. These figures were calculated by dividing total city park unit figures
by total system acreage figures.
54 Miller & Hobbs, supra note 1, at 332-33.
ssId. at 332 (citations omitted).
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Under such conditions, the urban land manager cannot serve as the
preserver of pristine nature as the superintendent of North Cascades
National Park might fancy himself to be. Rather, the urban land manager
more closely resembles someone trying to reconstruct a jigsaw puzzle with
56many of the pieces missing.As Gobster and Barro point out:
In many urban parks, historic conditions of... hydrology,
microclimate, and vegetation have been so severely
modified by past human activity that even the use of the
term restoration sometimes seems inappropriate.
Landscape fragmentation and adjacent land uses can also
limit how well the structure and function of an ecological
community can be restored and ecological processes ...
successfully reintroduced.57
With their small preserves segmented by roads and traffic, tainted with run-
off from surrounding impermeable surfaces, and choked by exotic species
of brush and weeds, the local land manager has a job description that is, if
not more difficult than the federal land managers, just as vexing in its own
distinct ways. If one were to summarize the mission of the local land
manager, it might be the following: to figure out a way to restore some
semblance of a healthy, functioning, ecological community, in the face of
the fundamentally altered ecology of the urban environment (with no
natural fires, large predators, or the omnipresent seeds of invasive species
always poised to germinate), while concurrently managing the impact of
56 There is a vigorous debate among environmentalists about whether to emphasize the
restoration or preservation of nature and what the proper role of humans in relation to nature should be.
Preservationism stresses the hubris and general destructiveness of human dominance over nature. Its
dualistic way of seeing humans and the natural world is well reflected in the Wilderness Act of 1964.
While most wholeheartedly support wilderness and the preservation of large intact ecosystems,
restorationists find this philosophy ill-suited to the goal of caring for the land in the places closer to
where most people live. From their perspective, an intense, hands-on, "interventionist" commitment is
required for the ecological health of the land being managed and to teach people to live more
harmoniously in the natural world. Compare William R. Jordan III, Restoration, Community and
Wilderness, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 23
(Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000) (arguing for restoration as a resolution to the conflict
between community and nature), MICHAEL POLLAN, SECOND NATURE: A GARDENER'S EDUCATION
(1992), and William Cronon, The Trouble with Wilderness; or, Getting Back to the Wrong Nature, in
UNCOMMON GROUND: RETHINKING THE HUMAN PLACE IN NATURE 69 (William Cronon ed., 1995),
with Eric Katz, Another Look at Restoration: Technology and Artificial Nature, in RESTORING NATURE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 37- (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull
eds., 2000).
57 Paul H. Gobster & Susan C. Barro, Negotiating Nature: Making Restoration Happen in an
Urban Park Context, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES 185, 185 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000) (citations omitted).
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heavy use, recreational demands, and policy preferences of various
stakeholders in diverse, heavily populated communities.
IV. THE CASE OF RESTORATIoN IN THE COOK COUNTY FOREST PRESERVES
Cook County, Illinois, consisting of Chicago and many of its closer
suburbs, is the second most populous county in the United States with an
estimated 5,285,107 people as of July 2007.58 Its system of public county
lands is one of the largest and oldest in the country.59 Created in 1916, the
Forest Preserve District of Cook County (hereinafter the "FPDCC") is an
independent park district with its own taxing authority. Like the six other
county forest preserve systems in the Chicago metropolitan area, the
FPDCC was made possible by an 1893 Illinois law, ("An Act to Provide for
the Creation of Pleasure Driveways and Park Districts") which created the
legal framework for such districts 60 While the FPDCC has an internal
bureaucratic structure overseeing approximately 700 employees, much like
any other executive branch agency, it is ultimately governed by a board of
elected commissioners. 6 1  Though the FPDCC and Cook County are
technically two distinct governments, Cook County law stipulates that the
FPDCC commissioners serve double-duty as regular county
commissioners.62
The FPDCC's 67,000 acres make up 11% of Cook County's land
mass.63 District policy calls for 80% of these holdings to be managed as
natural areas.64 Because of the FPDCC's long history, it has been acquiring
land for some time and much of these earlier acquisitions consisted of high
quality wild land.65  This might account for the fact that Cook County,
despite being inhabited by 41% of the state's population, leads the state's
counties in biodiversity.66 Despite this biodiversity, however, the FPDCC's
preserves have come to suffer the same indignities that afflict most urban
conservation lands.
58 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TABLE 7: POPULATION ESTIMATES FOR THE 100 LARGEST U.S.
COUNTIES (2008), http://www.census.gov/popest/countiestables/CO-EST2007-07.csv.
59 James H. Witham & Jon M. Jones, ANNUAL JOB PROGRESS REPORT App. B at 11 (1987).
60 Trudeau, supra note 25, at 62.
61 FOTFP REPORT 11, supra note 31, at 27-42.
62 Id. at 7.
63 Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, Land Acquisition Plan,
http://www.fpdcc.com/tier3.php?contentid=6 (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
64 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 72.
65 Id. at 62.
6 See Debra Shore, Controversy Erupts Over Restoration in the Chicago Area, 15
RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 25, 27 (1997) (quoting Peter Crane); FOTFP REPORT 1, supra note 4, at
63.
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A. A Brief Natural and Human History of Preserve Acreage
Over the decades, the wetlands, forests, savannas, and prairie
remnants in the FPDCC's holdings have become overrun with invasive
species, such as purple loosestrife, sweet white clover, garlic mustard,
honeysuckle, and black locust. Most pernicious of all, buckthorn, a small
Eurasian shrub-like tree, forms a dense understory layer below the forest
canopy of old native trees, especially oaks.67 In addition to crowding out
wildflowers, grasses, and shrubs of native woodland and savanna
communities, buckthorn's dense shade prevents the germination of the next
generation of oaks and most all other plants.68 As the old oaks succumb
without regenerating, oak woodlands will eventually be replaced by a thick,
non-native brush. 69 Furthermore, the bare forest floor, under the ubiquitous
buckthorn's dense shade, leaves FPDCC lands far more vulnerable to
erosion than they would naturally be.7°
In the post-settlement era, the absence of fire, an ecological process
endemic to northeastern Illinois, has also resulted in a fundamentally
altered ecology in the FPDCC.71 Formerly open woodlands, savannas, and
prairies, have all become dense and brushy with hawthorn, buckthorn, box-
elder, and ash trees.72 Additionally, unlike lands it acquired earlier, the
FPDCC's post-1950s acquisitions were largely agricultural and had been
planted with Eurasian meadow grasses or quickly reforested with fast-
growing non-native tree species.73 According to an exhaustive, and widely-
cited scientific survey, the result of decades of neglect and urban stresses
have left the FPDCC's holdings in a very "sorry state," with 68% of its
lands rated "poor" quality, 14% "fair" quality, and merely 18% of "good,"
"high," or "very high" quality.
74
The unique political culture of Chicago and Cook County, plagued
by traditions of political corruption and patronage-oriented machine
politics, has posed serious obstacles to the FPDCC's ability to recognize, let
alone effectively address, the ecological deterioration of its lands.75
Historically, the political leadership of the FPDCC has not always been
drawn from the ranks of natural resource professionals. But, while the
District Superintendent who served during the crucial period of 1964-1988
67 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 72-82 (detailing this invasive species-induced,
downward ecological spiral in the Cook County Forest Preserves).
6 8 Id. at 81-82.
69 See id. at 78-82.
70 See id. at 80.
71 See id. at 63-65.
72 See id. at 72-82.
" See id. at 63-65.
74 Id. at 75-76.
71 Interview with Stephen Packard, Director, Audubon Society, Chicago Region (Sept. 16,
2008) (noting the political power struggles involving the FPDCC) [hereinafter Packard Interview].
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may have known little about ecology or land management, he did
appreciate the importance of protecting, and expanding, one's political
fiefdom. 76 So despite its shortcomings, the FPDCC has traditionally been
fiercely protective of the sanctity of the forest preserve boundaries and
constantly vigilant of the ever-present threat of real estate deals, road
building proposals, and other private encroachments.77 Given the legendary
corruption, personalized politics, and insider wheeling-and-dealing that
have come to be associated with Cook County politics, this is no small
achievement.
At least in the past, a certain amount of latitude and freedom for
professional staff to manage natural areas as they saw fit was inadvertently
allowed by a disinterest in the details of land management among the Board
and, at times, the FPDCC's own leadership.78 It is important to note,
however, that this professionalism was not institutionalized, but rather
existed haphazardly in fairly isolated and uncoordinated pockets within the
agency. 79 Ecologically enlightened land managers, who fully appreciated
the extent of the ongoing degradation of county land, could never really
respond in any systematic or comprehensive way. Rather, land managers
primarily took action under the radar, relying on limited budgets, staff, and
little to no institutional support.80  The FPDCC bureaucracy, and its
resources, have been geared toward the 20% of District land classified as
recreational-the swimming pools, toboggan slides, picnic groves, golf
courses, playing fields, and parking lots.81 For instance, the maintenance
department, responsible for picking up trash and fixing up picnic areas and
infrastructure, has nearly three times more employees and three times the
budget than the Conservation Department and Forestry Departments
combined, even though these latter two departments manage 80% of
FPDCC land. 2
B. The Volunteer Stewardship Network
In the midst of this political context, in the late 1970s and early
1980s, a small group of citizen-activists with an evolving knowledge of,
and interest in, local plants and ecosystems, got the FPDCC's blessing to
begin small-scale restoration projects on several incipient prairies and
76 FOTFP REPORT L, supra note 4, at 11-12.
7
7 id. at 8, 11-12.
7 Id. at 12.
79 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
& Id.
8S FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 31, at 79.
r2 Id. at 36, 53; FOTFP REPORT 1, supra note 4, at 83-84.
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savannas along the North Branch of the Chicago River. 3 The FPDCC's
progressive 1913 charter, which instructs the agency to engage in restoring,
restocking, and protecting these natural areas,84 seemed tailor-made to
support such a project. The volunteers, who named themselves "The North
Branch Prairie Project," used hand tools to cut brush and girdle trees,
applied herbicide to buckthorn stumps to prevent regrowth, and, under
District guidance, set periodic fires to clear more brush.85  These
restorations proved so successful that by the end of the 1980s, this model of
volunteer restoration spread throughout FPDCC lands and into the other
metropolitan county forest preserve districts. 86  Eventually, under the
auspices of various county forest preserves and local environmental groups,
these efforts were organized into the Volunteer Stewardship Network
(hereinafter "VSN"), a strong new constituency for ecological restoration.87
The VSN consisted of more than 5,000 individual volunteers8 and
hundreds of certified site stewards who logged untold hours in restoration
activities on over 17,000 acres 89 spanning the entire metropolitan region.
The FPDCC's response to this citizen groundswell was an uneasy
mixture of support and resentment.90 On the one hand, it was with the
blessing and on-the-ground cooperation of sympathetic professional staff
that allowed the first restoration effects to get underway. The VSN was
also garnering frequent, and positive, coverage in the local media,91 earning
the support of most of Chicago's academic and institutional scientific
92nita
community, like the Chicago Academy of Sciences. To the extent it was
involved and made progress possible, the FPDCC shared in the accolades.
Yet volunteers, could be seen by some as pushing in on agency turf, making
land management decisions and, thereby, implicitly challenging the District
staff's expertise and credibility.93 "The last thing I need," said an official of
a neighboring county's forest preserve district, "is citizens walking around
83 See Harold L. Nelson, Prairie Restoration in the Chicago Area, 5 RESTORATION & MGMT.
60,64-66 (1987) (describing the early years of volunteerism in the FPDCC).
8 FOTFP REPORT 1, supra note 4, at iii (citing Cook County Forest Preserve District Act, 70
ILL. COMP. STAT. 801/7 (2010)).
85 Ben Joravsky, Up A Tree: Dreams of Prairie Restoration Turn into a Public Nightmare,
CHICAGO READER , Nov. 11, 1996, http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/up-a-
tree/Content?oid=892005.
86 FOTFP REPORT 1, supra note 4, at 67.
87 Id.
88 See Alf Siewers, Making the Quantum-Culture Leap: Reflections on the Chicago
Controversy, 16 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 9, 12 (1998).
89 Joravsky, supra note 85.
90 See Packard Interview, supra note 75.
91 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 67 (citing Paula Lauer, Nurturing Nature, CHI. TRIB.,
Aug. 9, 1992, at NW3; Stevenson Swanson, Unearthing the Prairie Past, CHI. TRtB., Nov. 19, 1995, at
Cl; Roy Harvey, The Evolution of a Prairie, CHI. TRim., July 7, 1996, at LI; Shirley Barnes, Ah,
wilderness, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 3, 1996, at NW1).
92 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
93 id.
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the woods making lists of things I need to do."94 Additionally, FPDCC
ranks included a number of the politically-appointed old guard, beholden to
what remained of the Cook County Democratic machine, which tended to
associate the volunteers (perhaps unfairly) with the independent liberal
reformers who were the machine's perennial enemy.95
Given the position the FPDCC found itself in, the VSN responded
with sensitivity, trying not to overload the field staff with demands or
undermine their authority, despite the fact that the volunteer stewards often
provided superior expertise, technical know-how, and the bulk of labor.96
Over time, as the District staff saw the benefits of exploding biodiversity on
restored lands, trust grew between the FPDCC and the volunteers, and a
more harmonious working relationship evolved.97 The VSN was seen less
as usurpers of authority and, instead, became a valuable new constituency
with the ability to help the FPDCC get positive publicity and refocus
priorities toward the conservation efforts which had previously been
neglected. 98 As the VSN grew, the FPDCC and neighboring forest preserve
districts began to hire more professional conservation staff in order to
adequately orchestrate volunteer efforts. 99  The FPDCC began seeing
restoration as a win-win opportunity.
By the mid-1990s, the VSN enjoyed ongoing press coverage,
including a book, Miracle Under the Oaks, by New York Times science
writer William Stevens.'00 The VSN also generated visits from national
and international delegations, star billing at restoration conferences, and
numerous awards. The VSN was eventually viewed internationally as the
model for citizen-led restoration.101 In 1993, the FPDCC and the VSN
formed Chicago Wilderness through a federal grant to support
restoration. 102 Consisting of dozens of environmental groups, local, state,






98 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
99 1d.
100 WILLIAM STEVENS, MIRACLE UNDER THE OAKS: THE REVIVAL OF NATURE IN AMERICA
(1995).
101 Shore, supra note 66, at 25; Nancy Freehafer, Controversy Over Restoration Endangers
NaturalAreas, CONSCIOUS CHOICE, May-June 1997, at 16, 16 (on file with the author and the Kentucky
Journal of Equine, Agriculture and Natural Resources Law).
102 Laurel M. Ross, The Chicago Wilderness: A Coalition for Urban Conservation, 15
RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 17, 21 (1997).
103 This group included the regional forest preserve districts, Chicago Park District, the
Illinois Nature Preserves Commission, Environmental Protection Agency Region V, the United States
Forest Service, National Park Service, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the Army Corps of
Engineers, museums, arboretums, universities, both major zoos and the Academy of Arts and Sciences.
Chicago Wilderness, Chicago Wilderness Member Organizations,
http://www.chicagowilderness.org/memberlist.php (last visited Feb. 13, 2010).
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Chicago Wilderness consortium hoped to become "a model both for citizen
participation and for inter-agency cooperation."'' 04  The restoration
community lobbied for the creation of Chicago Wilderness, intending to
provide a framework of institutional support for the VSN that would lend
additional legitimacy and political clout to its activities, enhancing its
ability to obtain grants and develop a comprehensive approach to
restoration across the metro area's 225,000 acres of public land.105
C. Criticism of the Restoration Movement
Ironically, political controversy over restoration exploded not long
after the official debut of Chicago Wilderness in 1996, when the
stewardship movement was at its zenith. The battle began in neighboring
DuPage County, where land managers had received an $11.6 million grant
to conduct oak savanna and prairie restoration on a huge, 7,000 acre
scale. 10 6 Soon thereafter, a group known as the Alliance to Let Nature Take
its Course (hereinafter "ATLANTIC") formed to stop the restoration,
asserting in its literature that "God made these non-native plants just as
surely as he made the Oak. ' 10 7 ATLANTIC adopted the motto: "4.5 billion
years can't be wrong."' 0 8  Restorationists dismissed these efforts,
considering them only a new project of animal rights activists who were
recently defeated in a different policy conflict over a county land deer
control program. 10 9 The restoration community had supported the deer
control program, and the animal rights activists were supposedly searching
for a new forum to continue their fight. 110 The fact that activists called into
a talk radio program warning that the controlled bums used during
restoration efforts were "frying baby rabbits and baby birds right where
they stand" would seem to support this notion. I'
This challenge might have quickly blown over were it not for the
efforts of a columnist for the Chicago Sun-Times, who picked up the story
with the article Half Million Trees May Face the Ax. 112 The columnist
turned the issue into something of a personal crusade, writing numerous
104 Ross, supra note 102, at 17 (quoting Press Release, Chicago Wilderness (April 1996)).
'05 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
106 Paul H. Gobster, Restoring Nature: Human Action, Interactions, and Reactions, in
RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 1, 3 (Paul H.
Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000).
107 Siewers, supra note 88, at 9.
'0s Peter Kendall, Trouble in Prairieland: Sacrificing Trees to Save Savannas Fuels a
Backlash, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1996, at C1.
109 Packard Interview, supra note 75. See generally Siewers, supra note 88, at 10-11.
110 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
. Siewers, supra note 88, at 9 (quoting Cindy Erickson, Director of Voices for Wildlife,
WGN-AM Radio Call-In Show (June 14, 1996)).
112 See Raymond C. Coffey, Half Million Trees May Face the Ax: DuPage Clears Forest
Land to Create Prairies, CHICAGO SuN-TMES, May 12, 1996, at 9.
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additional columns with sensational titles like Forest Preserve Brass
Shrugs Off Tree Hit List."3 These stories maintained a consistent angle,
describing a secretive and abusive cabal (the VSN) that had taken over a
treasured public resource and imposed its strange and destructive agenda
over a weak, compliant agency. "A forest preserve district cutting down its
forests"" 14 was a storyline that made perfect sense to the typically cynical
observer of Chicago-style politics.
Opposition to restoration ignited on a broader scale by the Fall of
1996. In response to intense pressure, the DuPage County Board of
Commissioners declared a moratorium on all restoration activities, while
people on talk radio began attacking tallgrass prairies as "the playthings of
'elitists.""' 5  Simultaneously, the anti-restoration movement spread into
Cook County, spearheaded by a number of politically well-connected
neighbors who did not like the restoration activities carried out on two sites
bordering their affluent Chicago neighborhoods-Edgebrook and
Sauganash.16  When these neighborhood opponents contacted their city
aldermen to complain, the Chicago City Council held hearings and began
pressuring the County Board, already feeling the heat from all the bad
press, to take action."
7
Although the Cook County Board and its President possess the
ultimate authority over forest preserve policy, they traditionally took such a
hands-off approach that critics deemed the FPDCC "the 'forgotten child' of
Cook County government."' 1 8  Now, however, Cook County Board
President John Stroger faced political heat and a media spotlight for a
program he knew or cared little about.' 19 He responded by claiming to be
as shocked as anyone. "When I heard trees were being cut down," he
assured the public, "I went bananas.' 120  Commissioners were similarly
caught off-guard: "I thought they were, you know, weeding-you know,
like you do in your garden. When I saw pictures of the stumps, I said, 'Hey,
what's going on here?"",121 As one journalist covering the story remarked,
"[n]ow the commissioners had to do something, anything, to show they
weren't as out of touch as they appeared."' 122 Consequently, President
Stroger issued an executive order that put a moratorium on all restoration
1 See, e.g., Raymond C. Coffey, Forest Preserve Brass Shrugs Off Tree Hit List, CHICAGO
SuN-TIMES, Oct. 11, 1996, at 6.
114 Siewers, supra note 88, at 12.
115 Kendall, supra note 108.
116 See Siewers, supra note 88, at 11.
117 Joravsky, supra note 85.
l" FOTFP REPORT II, supra note 31, at 6.
'
1 9 See Joravsky, supra note 85.
120 Andrew Fegeliman, Prairie Restoration Bid Fights to Stay Alive, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 30,
1996, at N6.
121 Jovorsky, supra note 85.
'2 id
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activity, including even seed collection, until hearings could be held and the
issue more thoroughly examined by the Cook County Board.
23
Critics offered a range of philosophical and practical arguments
against restoration. On a practical level, they opposed what they believed
to be the dangers of controlled bums, such as air pollution, the risk of the
fires getting out of control, and harm to animals. 24 Critics also opposed the
use of herbicides in the Forest Preserves on the grounds that they are
heavily used for recreation. Finally, those living near the preserves
particularly opposed the aesthetic changes that tree thinning and brush
clearance wrought. 25 Another set of complaints were more procedural in
nature: the VSN was seen as a secretive group who usurped authority and
undemocratically took control over a public resource. 126  These self-
appointed "gods of the forest preserves," as one critic called them, were
seen as running amok with little, or no, supervision or accountability.
27
Restorationists countered that the charge of secretiveness was completely
unsupported, given the intense media coverage that restoration had garnered
in the previous decade, as well as the VSN community outreach and
recruitment efforts.
28
The final set of arguments against restoration-that it was
destructive, arrogant, and wrong-headed-was the most difficult to address
as these arguments stemmed from a conceptually different social
construction of nature than the restorationists employed. 29 "We'd talk to
them about trees and they talked to us about biodiversity," said one
neighborhood activist, recounting unsuccessful attempts at coming to an
understanding with the restorationists. 30 , To the anti-restoration activists,
therefore, any attempt to second-guess the direction that unmanaged nature
took on the forest preserves was seen as supremely arrogant. According to
one observer, "[i]t is this professed ability to know what an ecosystem
wants that infuriates those opposed to restorations.'' Quite simply, critics
considered it an "egotistical" affront to suggest "that these forest preserves
123 Shore, supra note 66, at 26.
124 Paul H. Gobster, The Other Side: A Survey of the Arguments, 15 RESTORATION & MGMT.
NOTES 32, 33-34 (1997).
125 id.
1
26 Id. at 34.
127 Jovorsky, supra note 85; Andrew Light, Restoration, the Value of Participation, and the
Risks of Professionalization, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANrrES 163, 176 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000).
128 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
129 See generally Joanne Vining et al., Public Values, Opinions, and Emotions in Restoration
Controversies, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES
143 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000) (examining the perceptions and emotions responsible
for causing controversy with regard to restoration activities).
130 Jovorsky, supra note 85.
131 Kendall, supra note 108 (emphasis added).
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cannot take care of themselves,' 32 especially if the cure involved cutting
down healthy trees. Making matters worse, the long-standing FPDCC
policy to manage 80% of its holdings as natural areas' 33 was, according to
one commentator, misinterpreted by opponents to mean that 80% of
FPDCC's forests were to be converted to prairies, a feat that was neither
planned nor possible. 1
34
The moratorium on one of the biggest, and most successful,
restoration projects in the country set off an intense counter-mobilization.'
35
Because the VSN, at its core, was still a grassroots movement, it was able
to muster a large and vocal response. Commissioners were besieged with
calls, emails, and letters supporting restoration. 36  In three extremely
contentious hearings, the well-organized supporters of restoration, and their
greatly outnumbered opponents, testified for 16 hours.' 37 Perhaps the most
influential testimony came from the institutional partners of the newly
formed Chicago Wilderness consortium, the Vice President of the Field
Museum who flat out told the commissioners that, "[t]he natural processes
that sustain local ecosystems no longer work."'
138
To their credit, most commissioners, even if somewhat mystified
going into the hearings, did their homework and diligently wrestled with the
issue. In the meantime, however, nearly two decades of painstaking
restoration was rapidly unraveling with the moratorium still in place. 3 9
According to one FPDCC naturalist, the District's highest quality lands
were, in the absence of restoration activities, losing an estimated 2% of
their biodiversity per year.' 40 Worse still, the idle VSN was beginning to
dissipate and disperse along with some of the agency's more
knowledgeable restoration-oriented staff.'41  The loss of so much
accumulated knowledge concerning local plant communities and restoration
techniques threatened to devastate the entire restoration enterprise.
132 Gobster, supra note 124, at 35 (providing a nearby resident's quote as it appeared in an
unidentified news article).
133 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 72.
34 Siewers, supra note 88, at 11.
3' Shore, supra note 66, at 26-27.
136 Id. at 26.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 27. But see Jon Mendelson, Stephen P. Aultz & Judith Dolan Mendelson, Carving
Up the Woods: Savanna Restoration in Northeastern Illinois, 10 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 127
(1992) (questioning the value of restoration, including the arbitrary and often misguided "chronic
disturbance" model of restoration management).
139 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 71.
14 Id.
141 Id. at 70.
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D. The Restoration Movement's Recovery
In the end, the Cook County Board decided to allow restoration
activities to continue, albeit with considerable new layers of FPDCC
oversight and certification. 42 Various practices were phased back over the
course of the next few years-first seed collecting, then brush removal,
herbicide use, and, finally, controlled fires. 143 However, at the two sites
near the Edgebrook and Sauganash neighborhoods, political clout continued
to trump biodiversity,'A and a complete moratorium remained for ten years.
It was finally lifted in 2006.141
In the short-term, the political challenge to Forest Preserve
restoration certainly took its toll on local ecosystems and their caretakers,
but once the dust settled, the restoration movement emerged stronger and
more politically savvy. The restoration movement's position solidified
largely due to the considerable institutional weight and reputation of the
organizations in the Chicago Wilderness consortium supporting it. The
group operated exactly as intended in that by acting as a reservoir of
scientific and cultural capital, Chicago Wilderness made it difficult, if not
impossible, for local politicians or recalcitrant land managers to oppose the
group. The legitimacy conferred on restoration activities by their
association with preeminent institutions not only provided cover for
squeamish public officials, it also opened the door to accessing federal and
private grant money that might otherwise be out of reach.
While critics of restoration regrouped and remain quite active in
their opposition to restoration projects on the FPDCC, they find themselves
much more marginalized than during their heyday in the mid-1 990s.146 As
for the VSN, once most restrictions imposed by the moratorium were lifted
in the late 1990s, the group began taking on more complex and ambitious
projects with the grant money it began receiving. 47 The new focus on
larger restoration sites required much more planning and collaboration with
county land managers, as well as a shift to power tools and subcontracting
for larger-scale tree and brush removal.
148
While the increased political clout generated by Chicago
Wilderness, as well as the grants and more ambitious projects that followed,
pushed the VSN to a new level of effectiveness, the formation of Chicago
Wilderness did not come without risks. Specifically, once Chicago
142 Shore, supra note 66, at 31.
143 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
144 See Shore, supra note 66, at 31.
5 Mickey Ciokajlo, Burn Moratorium Lifted at 5 Forest Preserve Sites, CHI. TRiB., Oct. 6,
2006, at M6.
146 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
147 id.
148 id.
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Wilderness was created, the VSN moved in a new direction of
professionalization and quasi-governmental status (especially since one
result of the political battles of 1996 was increased certification required for
volunteers). Such changes threatened to diminish the VSN's standing as a
truly unique and democratic grassroots movement.
49
Although restoration was once again underway, the FPDCC faced a
particularly rough period spanning from 1998-2004 as budget problems
(including a $20 million deficit in 2001), low morale, and organizational
disarray, afflicted the agency.150  The media widely reported on the
distressed state of the FPDCC, due largely to a detailed and scathing report
released in 2002 by the Friends of the Forest Preserve, a watchdog group
that formed in response to the restoration controversy.' 5 ' This report
documented the FPDCC's deeply rooted problems and the shockingly poor
ecological condition of its lands.'52 This new round of bad press prompted
the new County Board President to fire the General Superintendent and
replace him with someone sympathetic and committed to restoration.
153
Furthermore, in 2005 the FPDCC increased its modest tax levy by 13.5%,
and the resulting budget, widely hailed by environmentalists, moved
significantly more resources towards conservation, including a new $3
million line item just for restoration.
54
The top-down shake-up caused by the Friends of the Forest
Preserve report created an opportunity not only for budgetary reform, but
also for a deeper cultural change in the organization. Through new
conservation-oriented hires, resource reallocation, and reorganization, the
District moved toward the mainstream of professional land management
agencies.155 In a telling gesture of how much things changed, the County
Board President began touting the importance of restoration in his annual
budget statement.'56
V. THE UNIQUE POLITICS OF URBAN CONSERVATION
As the restoration controversy in Cook County reveals, the politics
surrounding public land in urban areas differ from those surrounding
federal lands in more ways than scale alone. Vast differences in the
149 Andrew Light, Restoration, the Value of Participation, and the Risks of
Professionalization, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND
HUMANITIES 163 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000).
150 FOTFP REPORT I, supra note 4, at 20-24.
"' Id. at 22-24.
152 See FOTFP REPORT 11, supra note 31.
133 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
154 Mickey Ciokajlo, Old Foes Hail Forest Budgets: Groups Applaud County Preserves for
Turnaround, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 2, 2005, M3; Packard Interview, supra note 75.
155 Id.
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physical characteristics of public conservation lands at the federal and local
levels, involving considerations such as unit acreage, connectivity,
biodiversity, the nature of surrounding environment, and the level of
functionality in the local ecological system, make federal and local land
management essentially two different jobs. These on-the-ground facts,
when combined with very different legislative and regulatory mandates,
bureaucratic contexts, and interactions with interest groups, media, and the
general public, lead to very divergent political dynamics at the local level.
For federal land managers, this political environment has been very well-
described, but for local land managers, much less so.
A. The Legal Framework
In considering how the politics of local public land management are
distinct, perhaps the best place to start is with the legal framework that
undergirds such management. Simply put, land managers at the city and
county level tend to be far less constrained by legislative or regulatory
guidelines and requirements than federal managers.
While larger park systems and park districts, like the FPDCC, may
have federal-style charters and mission statements,' 57 they lack the layers of
federal legislation and the dense web of regulation that accumulate as
federal agencies interpret such laws for implementation. For instance, a
district ranger proposing a management plan for a specific planning unit in
his or her national forest will need to comply with the National
Environmental Policy Act (hereinafter "NEPA")' 5s and its raft of
requirements for public participation, the National Forest Management Act
(hereinafter "NFMA").I59 Additionally, when applicable, the district ranger
will need to comply with the Endangered Species Act, 160 the Wilderness
Act,' 61 the Clean Water Act, 62 the Northwest Forest Plan (if the forest is in
the northwestern U.S.), 163 and the so-called Roadless Rule of 2001.'16
To the contrary, local managers are comparatively unfettered in
their decision-making. In interviews with city and county land managers in
157 See Forest Preserve Dist. Of Cook County, Our Mission Statement,
http://www.fpdcc.com/tier3.php?content id= 1 (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
.5. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010).
'
5 9 See 16 U.S.C. § 472a (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010).
'
60 See 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010).
161 See 16 U.S.C. § 1131 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010).
162 See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 1, 2010).
163 See U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. & U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, RECORD OF DECISION FOR
AMENDMENTS TO FOREST SERVICE AND BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT PLANNING DOCUMENTS
WITHIN THE RANGE OF THE NORTHERN SPOTTED OWL (1994), available at
http://www.reo.gov/library/reports/newroda.pdf.
16 See Roadless Area Conservation Rule, 36 C.F.R. § 294.1 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 5,
2010).
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Wisconsin, local managers' flexibility and relative freedom of action
prevailed as a prominent theme.165 A city conservation director, expressed
sympathy for his federal colleagues, given the regulatory morass that he felt
they were bogged down in, and claimed he would never trade places with
them.166 Even though the director's department was relatively small, and
his resources quite limited, he reveled in his capacity for experimentation,
flexibility, and quick action.167 Consequently, the city conservation director
felt that small, local conservation agencies have the capacity to be far more
innovative, nimble, and responsive. 68 Even when a local agency does not
display these attributes (the FPDCC, for example), the reason usually has
more to do with internal factors-large size, internally imposed
bureaucratic procedures, or an organizational culture which favors turf and
inertia-rather than the need to comply with a complex overlay of
externally imposed requirements.
B. Organizational Factors
As previously mentioned, providing an accurate portrait of the
average local conservation agency is nearly impossible due to the huge
variation among the thousands of city and county park agencies; many are
tiny and have just a few full-time employees, while bigger agencies, like
Cook County or Maricopa County, manage as much land as some entire
states do. But despite vast differences in size and scope, local land
management agencies do share certain qualities. To a great extent, such
agencies tend to be creatures of their local environment. In other words,
personnel, organizational culture, decision-making styles, interpretation of
missions, and prioritization of competing values, are all influenced by the
local community and political environment in which the agency is
anchored. This could not be demonstrated more clearly than by the case of
Cook County, where many of the FPDCC's internal traits and dysfunctions
are best understood as byproducts of the local political culture and its
enduring system of machine politics. 69  Conversely, in some of the
outlying suburban counties of the Chicago metropolitan area, where
machine politics held less sway, the county forest preserve districts tended
to be well-run, highly professional organizations.
170
165 Interview with Russ Hefty, Conservation Director, City of Madison (WI) Parks
Department (Nov. 24,2008) [hereinafter Hefty Interview]; Interview with Darren Marsh, Director, Dane
County (WI) Parks Division (Dec. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Marsh Interview]; Interview with Kevin
Connors, Director, Dane County (WI) Department of Land and Water Resources (Dec. 1, 2008)
[hereinafter Connors Interview].
66 Hefty Interview, supra note 165.
'67 1d.
168 id.
169 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
17o Id.; see FOTFP REPORT II, supra note 31, at 22-43.
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The way the local context colors city and county land management
is not limited to its affect on the agencies themselves, but to how issues get
resolved. Whereas restoration became a hugely contentious issue in
northeastern Illinois, interviews with land managers in Madison and Dane
County, Wisconsin reveal that in those communities, such activities are
utterly uncontroversial.' 7 1  These land managers credit high levels of
knowledge about local ecosystems among residents, as well as a long
tradition of restoration, reaching back to the efforts of Aldo Leopold at the
University of Wisconsin Arboretum in the 1930s.1
72
While the notion of local socio-political factors shaping local land
management may seem quite obvious, one should consider it in relation to
federal land management. In his 1960 classic The Forest Ranger, Herbert
Kaufman notes how the U.S. Forest Service built institutional loyalty,
discipline, and esprit de corps by rotating rangers and superintendents in
and out of various national forests across the country to avoid undue
influence on those workers by any local community. 173 While an increased
sensitivity to local concerns has certainly infiltrated federal land
management since NEPA's enhanced participation requirements in the
1970s and the Sagebrush Rebellion of the 1980s, the notion remains strong
that the first and foremost job of the federal manager is to implement
federal law and policy in accordance with the agency's mission. 174 As one
gets further from Washington D.C., a feeling that federal managers are
imposed from afar permeates local communities abutting federal land.175 In
turn, a barrier, and occasionally a ferocious enmity, arises between local
residents and federal managers, 176 a dynamic that never really occurs in the
same way for city or county land managers.
While most land management agencies (federal, state, and local)
struggle to maintain adequate financing, it more strongly effects how
agencies at the local level operate. Local park agencies usually lack the
strong organizational culture, cohesion, and long history that federal land
management agencies possess. This lack of clout, coupled with a greater
financial vulnerability of cities and counties to economic cycles, creates a
17' Hefty Interview, supra note 165; Marsh Interview, supra note 165.
172 Hefty Interview, supra note 165; Marsh Interview, supra note 165.
173 KAUFMAN, supra note 6; Tripple & Wellman, supra note 6.
174 See CULHANE, supra note 7 (describing how a federal land manager balances cross-
pressures).
175 See Sandra Davis, Fighting Over Public Lands: Interest Groups, States, and the Federal
Government, in WESTERN PUBLIC LANDS AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLTICS, 23-27 (Charles Davis ed.,
2001) (providing summary of local opponents of federal control).
176 See, e.g., Florence Williams, The Shovel Rebellion, MOTHER JONES, Jan-Feb 2001, at 61
(providing an example of this phenomenon in describing the so-called "Shovel Rebellion" of Elko
County, Nevada, where certain local residents clashed with the U.S. Forest Service in a confrontation
that included threats, violence, and intimidation).
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much more unpredictable resource base for local park agencies.177 Several
ramifications result from this combination of features. One is that budget
constraints keep local park agencies small and their efforts modest.
Even in the comparatively well-funded Dane County Parks
Department, dealing with budget limitations remains the dominant
preoccupation of the staff members interviewed. 178  Dane County Park
officials look to creative revenue generation techniques, minimization of
infrastructure, and volunteer efforts to make ends meet, while describing
their spending prioritization as "triage.' 79 In Cook County and many other
local park systems, external grants are critical for agencies to attempt
restoration or adopt any initiatives exceeding basic operations. 8° Of
course, any time an agency becomes heavily dependent on external funding,
be it corporate, non-profit, or federal, the agency invites the criticism that a
grantor unduly influences the agency. Critics argue that this is precisely
what happened with the FPDCC and Chicago Wilderness. While Chicago
Wilderness was more of a grant-generating middleman than an actual
grantor, critics claimed that the FPDCC surrendered to the whims of this
powerful consortium, at least where restoration was concerned.' 8 ' Whether
or not this is true, Chicago Wilderness's ability to help FPDCC obtain large
grants for taking on ambitious restoration projects in turn ensured a pro-
restoration stance, professionalization, and eventual reform.
For a thousand-plus special park districts, independent taxing
powers create a far more stable budget and potentially more organizational
independence. 182 In interviews with staff members at the Dane County
Parks, a traditional executive agency, park district status was seen as
something of a holy grail. For these managers, park district status
represents a highly coveted, but unlikely reform that they wistfully claimed
would deliver them from their unending budget worries.183 When highly
professionalized conservation agencies do have special park district status,
as some of outer counties surrounding Cook County do, the results for
conservation and restoration can be quite impressive. These generally well-
run, well-funded agencies, tend to be immune to external political
interference. 
184
177 See Pub. Policy Inst. Cal., The Organizational and Fiscal Challenges of Providing Public
Services in Los Angeles County, RESEARCH BRIEF , June 2000, available at
http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_600MBRB.pdf (analyzing such financial vulnerability as it
applies to Los Angeles County).
178 Marsh Interview, supra note 165; Connors Interview, supra note 165; Hefty Interview,
supra note 175.
179 Marsh Interview, supra note 165.
180 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
181 Interview with Resource Ecologist, Cook County Forest Preserve (Sept. 9, 2008).
182 Trudeau, supra note 25, at 63.
183 Marsh Interview, supra note 175; Connors Interview, supra note 175.
18 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
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In Cook County's case, however, special taxing powers did not
eliminate budget woes. This result could be due to the manner of resource
allocation that prevailed in that particular political culture. Rather than
advancing conservation, much of the FPDCC's considerable budget went to
protect priorities and positions that critics saw as "dead wood" within the
District.'85
C. Public Participation and Public Opinion
Literature on federal land management focuses a great deal of
attention on the role of public participation. Whether public administration
should be a closed process of applying scientific and technical expertise, or
a more open and democratic process of soliciting and interpreting public
policy preferences, has long been a matter of debate.
The closed-off model of public administration that prevailed until
the 1970s, was, according to Hayes, in keeping with the Progressive Era
notions of scientific resource management. 116 To other critics, however,
federal agencies' disinterest in public input was less a matter of expertise
and more about their capture by entrenched interests engaged in resource
extraction on public land. 187 Regardless of the truth of either theory, federal
agencies were eventually forced by federal legislation (most prominently
NEPA) to open up their decision-making processes to a rigid set of
procedures and practices that ensure public participation. 188 To managers
more comfortable with the closed model of administration, participation
would grudgingly take the form of sharing and collecting information,
while participation to those who were more enthusiastic would become a
"social-political activity in which decision making should be shared
between land managers and their public."' 89
The role of public participation in land management politics at the
city and county level is a complex and somewhat contradictory matter; in a
way, there is both more and less participation at the local level. On the one
hand, mandatory and detailed participation requirements that exist at the
federal level are generally absent. A local manager can essentially ignore
185 Id.
186 HAYS, supra note 5.
'87 See, e.g., WILLIAM VOIGT, JR., PUBLIC GRAZING LANDS: USE AND MISUSE BY INDUSTRY
AND GOVERNMENT (1976); GRANT MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER & AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
188 There has been much debate as to whether four decades of mandated allowance of public
participation has influenced agency behavior and/or policy outputs at all. Compare CULHANE, supra
note 7, Deborah S. Carr & Kathleen Halvorsen, An Evaluation of Three Democratic, Community-Based
Approaches to Citizen Participation: Surveys, Conversations with Community Groups, and Community
Dinners, 14 SOC'Y & NAT. RESOURCES 107 (2001), and Wendy Nelson Espeland, Bureaucratizing
Democracy, Democratizing Bureaucracy, 25 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 1077 (2000), with Mohai, supra
note 7.
189 Car, supra note, at 767-68.
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public input and make all sorts of snap decisions in the field as he or she
sees fit, so long as those decisions remain relatively obscure and
uncontroversial. Instead, the decision of whether or not to solicit public
input tends to be a judgment call. If a proposal might prove controversial,
then a pre-emptive informational meeting might often be called, but if the
risk of drawing complaints is low, then managers simply do what they feel
is best.' 90 One circumstance in which local managers feel that deeper, more
interactive forms of public participation are appropriate, involves the
creation of long-term land use plans for the city or county. 191
While mandatory forums for public participation are hard to find at
the local level, the very nature of urban parks nonetheless assure vigorous
public involvement. Urban park systems' fragile, and fragmented, holdings
in densely populated areas set the stage for numerous boundary conflicts
involving an often crowded, and complicated, roster of neighbors,
recreationists, environmentalists, and other park users. If the principle "not
in my backyard" typifies America's decentralized politics, then it is also
important to remember that any urban park quite literally abuts many more
backyards than Denali or Isle Royale National Parks. The paradox of
public participation at the local level, is, therefore, as follows: while legal
requirements and official mechanisms for participation are scarce, the
public is most apt to perceive its stake in public land use decisions at the
most local, accessible, and familiar level of government. Therefore,
participation in land management at the local level is typically more ad hoc
and dependent on sporadic bursts of activism, while rigidly defined
procedures and on-going routinized participation exists at the federal level.
The history of restoration on FPDCC lands offers an excellent
illustration of the complex, and variable, role of the public in the politics of
local land management. The agency's decision-making structures were
devoid of mechanisms for gathering public input, and its organizational
culture was quite averse to seeking public input of any kind. 9 2  Not
surprisingly, the FPDCC generally acted in an isolated manner, viewing the
public as only a consumer of policy output rather than a partner in shaping
decisions. 193 "You don't ask the public," explained one FPDCC manager,
"you do it to them. You do it right, and they'll like it.' ' 194 Yet as the
restoration battle shows, activists, interest groups, and public opinion can
become the driving force regardless of what the FPDCC, or any other local
agency, may prefer.
190 See Marsh Interview, supra note 165; Connors Interview, supra note 165.
'9' Connors Interview, supra note 165
192 FOTFP REPORT lI, supra note 3 1, at 23.
193 Packard Interview, supra note 75.
194id.
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The interplay of interest groups in the Cook County restoration
conflict abounds with ironies and complexities. At the federal level, land
management policy battles follow a fairly predictable pattern:
environmental groups pitted against resource extraction interests or high-
impact recreationists, such as boaters, ATV-users, and snowmobilers, with
the federal agency either acting as facilitator or clearly taking sides (more
often the latter in the case of the U.S. Forest Service and Bureau of Land
Management). 95  Conversely, in Cook County such vividly-drawn lines
and categories blurred as all the groups involved claimed the
environmentalist mantle and aimed to protect their beloved forest preserves.
While ultimately backing the restorationists, the FPDCC was far more of a
bystander to the battle than an honest broker.
In federal policy battles, the supposed expertise of federal managers
in matters such as forestry and range-management has traditionally been
viewed with deep suspicion by environmentalists. Expertise in other
disciplines, like conservation biology, hydrology, or ecology, has been
asserted as an alternative to federal agencies' narrow, resource-oriented
forms of expertise. 196 Thus, federal policy conflicts have long involved
challenges to claims of agency expertise. The local struggle in Cook
County was no different in this regard, except that it was anti-restoration
activists who were challenging the expertise of VSN and its agency
sponsors. If one accepts that VSN restorationists more closely resembled
mainstream environmentalism than their opponents, and the roster of
environmental groups in Chicago Wilderness would seem to confirm
this, 197 then these environmentalists found themselves in a curious and
uncomfortable position; they were appealing to scientific and technical
arguments against passionate grassroots activism intended to save trees
from being cut down. Furthermore, the VSN found itself in the situation of
vigorously defending public agencies and "acronymed government
,,198programs. At one point in the debate, the VSN was even publicly
defended by Monsanto Corporation, the maker of herbicides used for
buckthorn control.' 99
195 See CULHANE, supra note 7 (articulating the so-called honest broker role for federal
agencies). But see BEN W. TWIGHT, ORGANIZATIONAL VALUE AND POLITICAL POWER: THE FOREST
SERVICE VERSUS THE OLYMPIC NATIONAL PARK (1983) (containing a good example of the federal
agency bias argument).
196 Hanna Cortner, The Governance Environment: Linking Science, Citizens, and Politics, in
ECOLOGICAL RESTORATION OF SOUTHWESTERN PONDEROSA PINE FORESTS 70-80 (Peter Friederici ed.,
2003).
197 See Chicago Wilderness, Chicago Wilderness Member Organizations,
http://www.chicagowildemess.org/memberlist.php (last visited Feb. 28, 2010) (listing all 251
participating members of Chicago Wilderness).
198 Siewers, supra note 88, at 12.
'99Id.
KY. J. EQUINE, AGRI., & NAT. RESOURCES L.
The irony of the situation is enhanced even further when
considering that VSN, which has been the heart and soul of the entire
restoration enterprise in northeastern Illinois, continues to remain one of the
best examples of collaborative and participatory grassroots environmental
activism. As noted by sociologist Reid Helford:
It is interesting to consider those competing definitions of
expertise and public involvement, especially when we take
into account the specific history of the volunteer
restorationist[s] in Cook County. At one time it was these
volunteers who challenged established authority in order to
extend the value and meaning of their work beyond simple
management activity to that of scientific authority.
Employing this rather conservative notion of expert
authority belies the historical grassroots, "citizen-scientist"
ethos of the volunteer restorationist.
2°°
But the appeal to scientific authority inherent in VSN's position, along with
its absorption into the larger quasi-governmental Chicago Wilderness
consortium, allowed critics to cast these volunteers as an elitist entity
pursuing nefarious purposes.20' In other words, the VSN was portrayed as
precisely the sort of people that the environmentally-inclined tend to
distrust.
Profoundly low levels of knowledge, and some contradictory
attitudes among the general public regarding local ecosystems and
restoration practices, added to the confusion and distrust.20 2 Random
surveys conducted soon after the height of the controversy found that while
90% of respondents agreed that restoring natural areas was good, and 75%
agreed that restoration to pre-settlement conditions would create healthier
ecosystems, 77% also opposed cutting mature trees or using herbicides in
the course of restoration-two of the most important restoration
techniques.20 3 Thus, the survey's authors reported "a wide gap between
approval of [restoration] goals and disapproval of the means of achieving
them.
, 204
A final element setting the Cook County controversy apart from a
typical federal policy conflict is the role played by the media. What
200 Reid M. Helford, Constructing Nature as Constructing Science: Expertise, Activist
Science, and Public Conflict in the Chicago Wilderness, in RESTORING NATURE: PERSPECTIVES FROM
THE SOCIAL SCIENCES AND HUMANITIES 119, 129-30 (Paul H. Gobster & R. Bruce Hull eds., 2000).
20 See id. at 125-28.
202 Susan C. Barro & Alan D. Bright, Public Views on Ecological Restoration: A Snapshot
from the Chicago Area, 16 RESTORATION & MGMT. NOTES 59 (1998).
203 Id. at 61-63.
' Id. at 63.
[Vol. 2 No. 2
2009-2010] POLITICS OF URBAN NATURAL AREAS MANAGEMENT 155
ultimately caused the restoration conflict to rapidly expand from an obscure
land management initiative to an intense conflict and dramatic moratorium
was heavy, aggressive, and consequential media coverage of a sort rarely
seen in federal policy battles. Perhaps media coverage plays a more pivotal
role in local issues because local land politics occur within a geographically
confined setting involving resources and actors well-known to a given
audience.
In the case of Cook County restoration, media coverage was a
double-edged sword. During the years preceding the controversy, the
VSN's restoration program was the subject of a consistent, fairly
sophisticated, and generally supportive stream of coverage. However, once
the conflict erupted, the coverage shifted to a much more dramatic angle
(i.e. "agency cuts down its own trees") and this served to mobilized enough
citizens to prompt the previously unaware, disinterested City Council and
County Board to become involved.
V1. CONCLUSION
The case of restoration in Cook County demonstrates that the
political contours of urban public land management at the local level differ
significantly from those surrounding the more familiar and well-described
management of federal public lands. Some of the differences between
federal and local land management are structural in that they are embedded
in the profound physical and ecological differences and management needs
of fragmented and degraded urban parcels, versus larger, contiguous federal
parcels. The former requires management focused on ecological
restoration, maintenance, and crowd supervision, while the latter often
features a combination of preservation and resource extraction. Other
differences lie in organizational factors, including resources, staffing,
organizational culture, legislative mandates, and the influence of the local
context. Finally, public participation, interest groups, public opinion, mass
media, and the perception of expertise within the agency all play a role in
setting apart local urban park management and the political dynamics that
mark it.

